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THE CIRCUIT COURT INQUISITION
INTO LEGAL ABUSES
PAUL

A.

HOLMES

AXLTHOUGH the Milwaukee Circuit Court's inquisition into legal
abuses is still in progress at this writing, the proceedings have
nevertheless been carried to such a point that a survey of the methods
employed and the results so far accomplished is now possible.
Weeks and perhaps months will almost certainly be necessary before
the inquisition will be brought to a definite close by action of the presiding judges on the application of the Lawyer's Club of Milwaukee
for a permanent injunction against ambulance chasing.
Ramifications of the inquiry will probably require an even longer
time for disposition-such as proceedings by the State Board of Bar
Examiners against certain attorneys. There is a probability that the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin, which to a certain extent sanctioned the
,matter at its beginning by refusing to intervene, may be called upon to
pass finally upon the validity of the entire procedure.
Due to the important jurisdictional and constitutional questions involved, and to the fact that attorneys all over the United States have
been-watching the case with a view to using it as a precedent for similar
proceedings in other communities where the ambulance-chasing "industry" has gained a stranglehold upon personal injury business, a
final ruling from the Supreme Court, if such is called for, will undoubtedly be of lasting value in determining the power of courts to
inquire into and control unethical practices.
The inquisition-of the Milwaukee court was begun upon the petition
of directors of the Lawyers' Club as a special proceeding. The
petitioners enumerated various abuses which they said they had learned
were being practiced in the city by attorneys and by persons not
attorneys. It was explained in the petition that while these actions
constitute common law misdemedanors, prosecutions, except in the clearest cases, are too slow and uncertain to be an adequate deterrent.
The petition concludes with the following prayer:
Your petitioners, in asking the aid of this court in remedying the
aforesaid abuses, hereby offer their utmost aid to the court in gathering evidence, and to assist the court in rendering its remedies and
mandates effective. On behalf of the dignity of our courts and the
cause of justice, your petitioners .ask that an inquisition be instituted
by and in this court, that all parties found to have been participating
in any of the said practices be brought into this court in some appropriate action or proceeding, and that they be dealt with according to
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law; that such other remedy or remedies may be granted and exercised
as may be found equitable and proper, to the end that justice may be
done.
Specific charges contained in the petition included the following:
That certain attorneys have for a considerable time been soliciting
citizens to start actions and claims for damages.
That lately such soliciting has been done by persons not members of
the bar, and who employ large numbers of persons to get contracts
for suits in wholesale lots.
That such men have provided printed blank contracts for signature
by accident victims, providing for the prosecution of suits.
That these contracts provide for the payment of disbursements by
the litigant, but that the disbursements are seldom, if ever, paid under
the prevailing practice.
That these men (popularly called 'ambulance chasers') employ persons in a position to "tip-off" accidents, so that their solicitors may
appear without delay to solicit actions before anyone else.
That these men settle as many cases as they can, in order to avoid
employing attorneys, thus to avoid splitting fees, and frequently group
numbers of claims and cases and effect lump settlements without regard to the individual rights of the parties.
That the patronage of those charged with criminal offenses and misdemeanors is solicited; that this action is rife in Milwaukee county
and proceeds through devious means and by divers agencies and by
means of confederates, and that several attorneys in the city are parties
to such practice.
The petition was referred to Circuit Judge Charles L. Aarons,
who at the time of its filing was presiding over the Circuit Court's
calendar, and the judge called the petitioners before the court to explain
the type of proceeding they had in mind. This explanation was given
by Attorney Lyman G. Wheeler, former president of the Lawyers'
Club, who informed the Court that the first necessity was an inquisition-a hearing where witnesses could be subpoened and examined in
regard to their knowledge of facts under investigation. After the court
was by this means placed in possession of the facts, ways and means of
effective remedial action could be considered, he said.
Judge Aarons assumed jurisdiction of the case in an order containing
less than one hundred words. He set the matter for a "hearing and
further proceedings according to law," and announced that at the
place and date designated "the petitioners may present proofs in support
of their petition."
Subpoenas for several persons believed to be ambulance chasers were
promptly issued by the directors of the Lawyers' Club, and this move
was followed by an application to the Supreme Court, in behalf of one
of the men subpoened, for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court
refused to grant this writ, and the inquisition began as scheduled.
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was summoned as the first witness and was questioned
Mr.
about testimony he had previously given in a Civil Court suit for
collection on a note where he had admitted conducting an ambulance
chasing business as a result of which he had an interest in from five
hundred to six hundred lawsuits pending in the Milwaukee courts.
He objected to answering questions on the ground that his answers
might incriminate him, but, except in a few cases, he was compelled by
the Court to answer in spite of this objection. Judge Aarons ruled
that he could be questioned about his voluntary admissions in the
previous suit.
Mr.
testimony was the starting point for a veritable cascade
of revelations regarding the extent to which the ambulance chasing
business had been developed in Milwaukee.
More than a dozen attorneys came forward voluntarily and confessed
that they had accepted cases from solicitors on fee-splitting arrangements. They offered to and did submit lists of such cases, and announced their willingness to co-operate with the court in stamping
out the evil.
Other ambulance chasers were called and examined. The hearing
continued for an entire week, and each day was crowded with important testimony "amply supporting," as Circuit Judge Gustave Gehrz
pointed out in a subsequent decision, the charges made in the petition.
Judge Gehrz and Judge John J. Gregory were requested by Judge
Aarons to assist him in the conduct of the inquiry, and the three judges
sat en banc during the proceedings.
An indication of the theory under which the court acted in assuming
jurisdiction of the matter was given by Judge Gehrz in remarks from
the bench on the closing day of the first session of the inquisition.
"We do not claim," he said, "to make final orders or injunctions in
this proceeding, but we have indicated and we still believe very earnestly
that the Court has ample power to get the truth when it affects the
administration of justice, and, particularly, cases now pending in this
Court."
The judge was outspoken in his denunciation of the ambulance
chasing "profession."
"This solicitation," he declared, "has been carried on by men who
are not lawyers, who have no right to practice law, business men in
the cold sense of the word, who go out among the poor and the
gullible, as this testimony so convincingly discloses.
"Oh, we are not blind to the fact that the men who have worked
at this business have posed as the friends of the poor and the unfortunate, but it is evident that altruistic motives alone could not have
prompted their course of conduct. With them it was a business to get
as much money as possible.
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"And their work serves in the eyes of the people to discredit the
legal profession," he pointed out. "The legal profession has been made
to suffer for something that over 90 per cent of the lawyers are not
responsible for-have nothing to do with-and therein lies the misfortune for the great majority of lawyers who are striving hard to
make a living and at the same time observe their obligation to the laws
of the land and the rules of public policy that are so well recognized."
The next step in the inquisition was the summoning into court of the
plaintiffs and defendants in each lawsuit where attorneys or ambulance
chasers had admitted or evidence had indicated that improper practices
had been involved. These plaintiffs and defendants were notified that
their cases would be assigned by the calender judge for immediate
hearing "for the purpose of determining any issue involving champerty,
maintenance, abuse of process or prosecution in furtherance of any
contracts or arrangements otherwise violative of public policy, to the
end that if any such taint be found to exist the court may make such
order or disposition as may appear to be just, proper and efficacious."
More than one hundred and fifty hearings were held in such cases.
The judges found themselves confronted with two important questions
in making disposition of them. The first was whether a contract between an injured person or person having a prospective cause of action
and a claim adjustor not an attorney at law, giving the adjustor a lien
upon the amount settled for or recovered, is a valid and enforceable
contract. The second was whether the court has a right to remove as
the attorney of record in a case any attorney who is found to have
been a party to a champertous contract in connection with such case.
Judge Aarons answered both of these questions in a decision in the
case of Martha Chonas v. the Milwaukee Electric Railway and Light
Company. He said:
The contract for services and compensation was made by and between one and Martha Chonas and Mike Chonas. The plaintiff was to pay for the services 33Y3 per cent of the amount settled for
or recovered,
was given a lien for said percentage on the
cause of action. In an action for unliquidated damages, there was no
lien at common law before judgment, nor has our statute given such
a lien to one who is not an attorney at law. Therefore, one who is not
an attorney at law can acquire no lien on the cause of action before
judgment, and a contract attempting to give such a lien is without
force and effect. Stanley v. Bouch, 107 Wis. 225, 230, 231.
The testimony of Mrs. Chonas makes clear that she was not to pay
expenses nor anything whatever in the event she lost her case. It
must be held that the contract so made between
and the plaintiff
and her husband is clearly champertous. Said transaction is, therefore, absolutely void, and the court may, upon the situation being
brought to its notice, dismiss the action, or, under some circumstances,
permit the action to remain upon the calendar. Blixt v. Janowiak, 117
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Wis. 175, 183. Although the contract for services was made by the
and apparently not directly with the plaintiff's
plaintiff with
attorney, yet it appears that the plaintiff's attorney accepted the case,
knowing of the making of the contract, or having good reason to know
of the making of the contract. In the light of the proceedings in the
matter of the Churchill petition and the testimony in the present proceeding, it must be held that the plaintiff's attorney must be presumed
, if he did not have actual
to have knowledge of the practice of
knowledge of the true arrangement made. In this class of cases, I am
convinced that there was a relation of principal and agent between the
attorney and the solicitor.
Under a well established doctrine, one who acts through another is
bound by another's acts. As the old Latin maxim goes, "Qui facit per
alium facit per se," that is, he who acts through another acts for
himself. It would be a sad c6mmentary upon the standards governing the legal profession if champertous contracts made through'solicitors were to be considered completely whitewashed when the attorney
has taken the case so procured, knowing the practice and method of the
solicitor. The solicitor being under the lawyer's wing, the lawyer
must acknowledge him as his own. The attorney is, therefore, precluded from asserting that he himself made no champertous contract.
Although the plaintiff's attorney had relinquished his connection with
all interest in this case, he was permitted to make a statement in which
he urged, in effect, that where the plaintiff desires to again retain the
same attorney, the court must permit her to do so, providing the
contract be purged of the taint of champerty. I believe it is the duty
of the court to hold to the contrary in view of the entire record being
here considered. Cases may arise, where, because of exceptional circumstances, the claim should be allowed, but it would be subversive to
the effective administration of justice, and it would seriously impair
the strength of the principles which are recognized by the common
law and by the Bench and Bar olf this country, if, in each such case
as the one now being considered, the same counsel should be retained
where the plaintiff made such request, even after the contract was
purged of its champerty.
The attorney should remember that in the practice of the profession
he is charged with a dual function: first, to serve the public in aid of
the administration of justice, and, second, to promote the interests of
his client. The function first named is the primary function, and the
latter in all instances must be subservient to the former. See opinion
of Justice Doerfler in the Petition of Board of Bar Examiners, 21o
N.W. 710. In his capacity as an officer of the court and exercising
his paramount public function, the attorney should recognize that it
will best promote the public interest as well as that of his former client,
that he firmly decline to again appear in a case from which, for ample
cause, he has withdrawn and wherein the circumstances are as herein
disclosed.
Since the foregoing was written, developments have indicated that
the legality of the procedure followed in the inquisition will almost certainly be tested in the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. A local attorney,
whose acti-ities were discussed during the proceedings, filed suit against
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three of the directors of the Lawyer's Club, charging them with conspiring to use the inquisition as a pretext for destroying his reputation.
He was invited to appear before the judges of the inquisition, and on
his appearance, was ordered to submit testimony in support of his
charges. He refused to do so on the ground that the tribunal did not
sit as a court but as an inquisitorial tribunal without the right to compel
him to testify under oath and was adjudged in contempt of court.
A thirty day sentence in the county jail was imposed. He also contended that the court had exceeded its jurisdiction by permitting evidence to be introduced concerning him, without notice, and an opportunity to appear and cross examine having first been accorded him.
A stay has been granted to permit an appeal.
As was stated at the begining of this article, the proceedings are still
in progress, and it is impossible, therefore, to do little more at this
time than to survey the methods employed and the results accomplished
to date.
However, it may be stated that, regardless of the ultimate result or
of future developments, the inquisition has served to open the eyes of
the public in general to a condition which had grown up, cancerous-like,
as a menace alike to the public and to the profession. Indications are
that the principles which made this airing possible will remain an
effective weapon for the protection of both and that a renewed and
strengthened confidence by the people in the legal profession and in
the courts will result.

